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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000431

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SUBJECT: KAMERHE ADVISOR DISCUSSES DEMOCRACY AND THE EAST

REF: KINSHASA 422

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Garvelink for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: Manya Moupondo, Diplomatic Advisor to former National Assembly President Vital Kamerhe and GDRC delegate to the GDRC-CNDP political talks, told Emboffs that the transition from Kamerhe to the new Assembly President, Evariste Boshab, has been smooth. She expressed some concern that Boshab would limit debate in the National Assembly. The PPRD leadership, in Moupondo's view, increasingly believes it does not need coalition partners, aggravating tensions between the PPRD and Joseph Nzanga Mobutu's UDEMO party. Disaffected PPRD parliamentarians, UDEMO and even the opposition MLC might consider some kind of alliance in the future, according to Moupondo. The Amami Program will soon be subsumed into Prime Minister Muzito's emerging Stabilization Plan. Moupondo opined that, although the Nande might lose out to growing Rwandophone influence in North Kivu, the Nande will remain a political force on the national level. Moupondo offered interesting insights on the new CNDP leadership, particularly Executive Secretary Jean Munyampenda -- the brains behind the group -- and President Desire Kamanzi -- who many perceive as more Rwandan than Congolese. End summary.

Kabila-Kamerhe Split

2. (C) PolCouns and PolOff recently met with Manya Moupondo, Diplomatic Advisor to former National Assembly President Vital Kamerhe and GDRC delegate to the GDRC-CNDP talks. Moupondo pointed out that the process of Kamerhe's resignation and the election of a new Executive Bureau transpired smoothly and democratically. Moupondo speculated that Kamerhe's public criticism of the lack of parliamentary knowledge about joint FARDC-RDF operations was not the undelying cause of his fall from grace within the presidential majority. According to Moupondo, many in the PPRD opposed Kamerhe's support for greater RC participation in regional economic initiatives especially with East Africa; others in the PPRD feared that Kamerhe would use the current parliamentary session to institute greater legislative control over the government. Moupondo expressed repudiation that the new President of the National Assembly, Evariste Boshab, had already indicated that he would limit debate in the National Assembly.

Selling Brand Names: Kabila and Mobutu

3. (C) Moupondo offered up interesting insight into the 2006 alliance between Kabila and Joseph Nzanga Mobutu, leader of UDEMO, in the second round of the presidential vote. According to Moupondo, most observers had anticipated a

"natural" alliance between MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba and Nzanga Mobutu, who is Bemba's brother-in-law (married to Bemba's sister) and also a native of Equateur Province. Moupondou said that during the 2006 elections, she counseled Nzanga Mobutu to contribute the value of his name recognition to the Kabila camp. She told him that the symbolism would be enormous, i.e., the one reconciling the two families, and, by extension, the entire country. At the same time, unbeknownst to Moupondou, Kamukama had advised Kabila to do the same thing. Recently, a rift has developed between UDEMO and PPRD, following UDEMO's exclusion from the National Assembly's newly constituted Executive Bureau. When PolCouns pressed Moupondou about a possible electoral alliance consisting of disaffected PPRD, UDEMO, and/or even MLC, Moupondou acknowledged that in the future, this would be "quite possible." (Note: While the symbolism is important, UDEMO is not a major player in DRC politics and does not even receive significant support in the Mobutu homeland of Equateur, where Bemba is king. End note).

¶4. (C) Moupondou opined that many in the PPRD leadership increasingly believe they can now "go it alone," without any need for coalition partners. She maintained that Kabila's inner circle displayed an inward-looking tendency, often suspicious of western ideas and objectives.

Amani, Rwandophonie, and the "New" CNDP  
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¶5. (C) The Amani Program, according to Moupondou, was on its last legs. Relevant elements of Amani would be integrated,

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via government decree, into Prime Minister Muzito's emerging Stabilization Plan, focusing on development issues, with the FARDC taking on greater responsibility for security issues. She added that a monitoring committee, likely under the PM's guidance, would ensure follow-up for the various agreements, i.e., the January 2008 Goma Accords, and the March 2009 GDRC agreements with the CNDP and North and South Kivu armed groups. The international facilitation's role would shift towards that of a partner (read less active participation), rather than an implementer. The new process would piggyback on the already existing UNDP stabilization efforts in Eastern DRC.

¶6. (C) Responding to our questions about growing Rwandophone influence in North Kivu, Moupondou acknowledged that many forces were actively promoting this concept. Surprisingly, in her view, there was a strong level of Hutu support for the idea of administratively dividing up North Kivu. She added that Hunde elements could align themselves with the Nande to oppose increasing political and economic domination by the Rwandophone community. She opined that the Nande would still remain a powerful group on the national political level, even if they are losing power in North Kivu.

¶7. (C) Moupondou provided her analysis of the "new" CNDP leadership, particularly Desire Kamanzi and Jean Munyampenda. She became acquainted with both during the early 2009 GDRC-CNDP negotiations. According to Moupondou, Munyampenda, who is the CNDP Executive Secretary, considers himself a "true Congolese Tutsi," i.e., not a Rwandan proxy. He is, in Moupondou's opinion, brilliant, the brains behind the CNDP. He implicitly touts his status as a "three-time rebel," emphasizing that he has been a member of three rebel movements (AFDL, RCD-Goma, and CNDP), but has been able to subsequently rehabilitate himself following all of these experiences. As a member of AFDL, he was reportedly well-received in Kinshasa, as he had spent a good portion of his youth in the capital. Forced to leave the DRC in 1998, he returned the same year with RCD-Goma. He was a co-founder of the CNDP, remaining with the group through the recent leadership change.

¶8. (C) Moupondou noted that CNDP President Kamanzi had strong

ties to Rwanda and the Rwandan Presidency. He is reportedly a nephew of AFDL co-founder Deogratias Bugera. Moupondo maintained that there is also a family connection with former CNDP military head Bosco Ntaganda, probably through marriage.

Moupondo maintained that the military wing of the CNDP (Bosco Ntaganda) wields the real power within the group, with the political side grafted on to the military organization.

19. (C) Comment: Moupondo is one of our most informed interlocutors on a variety of issues. Born of a Congolese father and a Swedish mother, she lived many years abroad and is international in outlook and highly articulate in English.

Her work both in the National Assembly and for the GDRC negotiating team gives her insight into key individuals and trends. She is definitely a Kamerhe protege; it is unclear where she will ultimately land. She did not conceal her disappointment over Kamerhe's fall from power, waxing melancholic about Kamerhe's hopes to make the DRC a more outward oriented democracy. Her assessment of the CNDP leadership confirms what we have heard from other sources (reftel) that Kamanzi, apparently cognizant of his perceived status as a Kigali proxy, has allowed Munyampenda and Bosco to run the CNDP's political and military wings, respectively.

Particularly interesting, but at this point improbable, is the prospect that some kind of constellation of opposition and disaffected PPRD elements might somehow align themselves to constitute a more robust opposition to the PPRD. End comment.

GARVELINK